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ABSTRACT 
For decades, the drug problem has been approached primarily in the context of a 
war on drugs, in which militaries and law enforcement agencies are used to execute drug 
prohibition and punitive policies. So far, this solution has only managed to increase the 
resilience of illegal drug supply chains to the detriment of the resilience of individuals, 
states, and the international order, as the case studies of Mexico and Brazil demonstrate. 
By contrast, case studies of Switzerland and Peru exemplify the advantages of pursuing a 
broader, system-oriented approach. This thesis examines the advantages of exhaustively 
studying a problem to offer sound alternative solutions. In their role as problem solvers, 
systems thinkers must provide decision makers with reliable tools to implement strategies 
with the greatest probability of success. Thus, the study of the complex drug problem 
cannot be limited to fragmented analyses that offer short-term solutions based on simplistic 
heuristics. This thesis uses qualitative-exploratory analysis, case studies, and system 
dynamics concepts to capture the drug problem structure and behavior in causal loop 
diagrams. In the case of Mexico, the application of these tools and methodology leads to 
recommending the development of legitimate job opportunities—guiding government 
and non-government investment and improving security conditions—as a 
potential leverage point alternative to the war on drugs’s punitive policies for 
mitigating the drug problem. 
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In arguments about policies intended to counter the illegal trafficking of drugs, 
traditional thought holds that if there are armed groups dedicated to drug trafficking, there 
must be government forces to combat them. This narrative of cause and effect is engaging 
for its simplicity and the several factors that strengthen it. For example, almost since its 
inception, the war on drugs (WD) strategy has been deemed a “failure” in many opinion 
pieces and think-tank publications because, besides its high cost and questioned results, it 
results in violence, death, mass incarceration, corruption, and political destabilization.1 
Yet, at least two factors contribute to this skewed perception of the WD. The first factor 
lays in the genesis of the term. In 1971, President Richard M. Nixon coined the expression 
“war on drugs,”2 correlating the public policy with the use of warlike resources and 
violence. The second factor is that the word “war” implies the engagement of two or more 
antagonists to settle differences. Derived from that policy’s warlike idea and the word 
“drugs,” the attention is oriented, on the one hand, towards the state’s police and military 
forces, and on the other hand, towards all the armed criminal groups intervening in the 
drug-supply chain. 
Meanwhile, most popular media outlets compete for the coverage of armed 
confrontations between authorities and drug traffickers, seizures of noticeable drug 
shipments, or political struggles about budget allocations for the security forces to combat 
drug trafficking. Besides, the entertainment industry, film, and television have often 
romanticized drug trafficking, sometimes apologizing for the criminality involved. Thus, 
in the struggle for audience share, the vast majority of popular media guide public opinion 
toward the physical confrontation between criminals and authorities, generating an 
availability bias that distorts much of the subject’s formal discussions. 
 
1 George P. Shultz and Pedro Aspe, “The Failed War on Drugs,” The New York Times, January 1, 
2018, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/31/opinion/failed-war-on-drugs.html. 
2 Chris Barber, “Public Enemy Number One: A Pragmatic Approach to America’s Drug Problem,” 
Richard Nixon Foundation (blog), June 29, 2016, https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2016/06/26404/. 
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Moreover, the journalistic and academic analyses and debates often fail to 
recognize the systemic characteristics of the drug problem and attempts to counter the 
problem. For instance, in many of these studies, alternatives to direct confrontation revolve 
around legalization or government control of the supply of drugs; however, they generally 
fail to recognize the effects of such proposals over extended time frames or their impact on 
other areas of social activity. This lack of systems thinking misses a complex underlying 
reality and potential alternatives or complements to the traditional military and law 
enforcement frontal fight against drug trafficking organizations. Over the long term, the 
problem has persisted and worsened. These factors have spread the idea that WD is only a 
policy confronting security forces and members of the Drug Trafficking Structures (DTS), 
leaving aside, for instance, political, economic, and social aspects related to the genesis 
and effects of the WD. 
From another perspective, to guarantee the best chances of success in exploiting 
intelligence work means that the Special Forces of the leading military and security corps 
receive a large part of the frontal combat burden against criminal organizations. This 
operational prominence exposes government forces to a great deal of media coverage, 
putting their credibility and prestige at stake. There has been very little research focused 
on the specific role of Special Forces to understand the drug problem’s system dynamics 
better. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research questions this thesis addresses are: What are the underlying system 
dynamics of the drug problem in Mexico; and, are there leverage points that could be 
exploited to reduce the drug problem by changes in public policy?  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review draws on systems theory and explores topics in different 
human knowledge fields associated with the drug problem. The first section focuses on 
concepts of systems thinking and system dynamics as disciplines of systems theory.3 
Drawing on the three analysis images established by Kenneth Waltz in studying 
international relations,4 the second section explores the drug problem perceived as a threat 
by the individual, the state, and the international system. The third section considers those 
entities’ resilience from Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez’s adversarial innovation perspective. 
Finally, the biases and misconceptions surrounding the drug problem are reviewed in the 
fourth section. This chapter aims to introduce the systems perspective and terminology 
from which the drug problem is analyzed and to illustrate the problem’s complexity and 
bounds. 
A. SYSTEMS THEORY 
Russell Ackoff contrasts the machine age with systems thinking.5 The former 
decomposes a whole (analysis), studies its constituent parts, and finally, synthesizes 
individual findings to explain the whole. In this analytical process, Ackoff identifies 
“structure” as the main focus and “how things work” as the final finding. By contrast, 
systems thinking first identifies the system to which the component to be studied belongs 
(synthesis) and later explains the behavior as a whole. Systems thinking explains the 
component’s behavior in terms of its function within the system. The synthesis process 
associated with systems thinking has a functional focus and seeks to explain why things 
operate in a certain way. Complementing Ackoff, Yuri Raydugin argues that “Systems 
 
3 Yuri Raydugin, Handbook of Research on Leveraging Risk and Uncertainties for Effective Project 
Management, Advances in IT Personnel and Project Management (AITPPM) Book Series (Hershey, PA: 
IGI Global, 2016), 157. 
4 Kenneth Waltz and Stephen M. Walt, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2018). 
5 Russell Lincoln Ackoff, Creating the Corporate Future: Plan or Be Planned For (New York: Wiley, 
1981), 16–19. 
4 
Thinking is a causality driven approach to describe the inter-relations between parts and 
systems.”6 
In contrast to the qualitative nature of systems thinking, Raydugin ascertains that 
system dynamics (SD) “quantifies the impact on the interactions between parts and 
systems.”7 Norman Porter details the concept affirming that SD is a mathematics, physics, 
and engineering-based tool that can be applied in behavioral, physical, and technical 
areas.8 The broad spectrum of fields that SD comprises makes it a multi-disciplinary 
technique that can provide insight into bounded systems. Porter concludes that SD is a tool 
that could be helpful in planning, policy analytics, and decision-making in uncertain and 
complex environments. System is a central concept in the literature about systems thinking 
and system dynamics. 
Donella Meadows defines a system as a “set of elements or parts coherently 
organized and interconnected in a pattern or structure that produces a characteristic set of 
behaviors, often classified as its ‘function’ or ‘purpose.’”9 This definition highlights the 
importance of structure to understand a system’s behavior. System dynamics offers the 
graphical solution of causal loop diagrams (CLD) to assess the system’s structure and, 
therefore, its behavior. CLDs are representations of the feedback structure within 
systems.10 According to Porter, in a CLD, the interaction between independent (causes) 
and dependent (effects) variables are presented with polarity.11 On the one hand, a positive 
(reinforcing) polarity indicates that as the cause increases or decreases, the effect changes 
in the same direction. On the other hand, an inverse change in the effect as compared to an 
 
6 Raydugin, Handbook of Research on Leveraging Risk and Uncertainties for Effective Project 
Management, 157. 
7 Raydugin, 157. 
8 Norman Wayne Porter, “The Value of System Dynamics Modeling in Policy Analytics and 
Planning,” in Policy Analytics, Modelling, and Informatics: Innovative Tools for Solving Complex Social 
Problems, ed. J. Ramon Gil-Garcia, Theresa A. Pardo, and Luis F. Luna-Reyes (San Antonio, TX: Springer 
International Publishing, 2018), 124, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61762-6_6. 
9 Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green 
Pub., 2008), 188. 
10 Porter, “The Value of System Dynamics,” 124. 
11 Porter, 124. 
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increase or decrease of the cause is represented with negative polarity (balancing 
feedback). An even number of negative feedback instances indicates a reinforcing behavior 
in the loop, whereas an odd number means that the loop has a balancing behavior.12 John 
Sterman stresses the importance of feedback processes by attributing to them the dynamics 
of all systems and analyzes learning from a feedback perspective.13 
To Sterman, learning variants are single- and double-loop from the feedback point 
of view (Figure 1).14 In single-loop learning, the decisions are based on rules defined by 
the mental models at hand. The implemented strategies impact reality, and decision makers 
adjust further decisions with feedback from the real world. The adjustments are given with 
the wishful thinking that the results will be improved the next cycle, but it does not always 
work that way. Double-loop learning establishes a bridge between the real-world feedback 
and the mental model. Consequently, the mental model is adjusted, resulting in changes in 
the strategies, the systems’ structure, and decision rules leading to different decisions. The 
change in the system’s structural perception allows defining its boundaries and the beliefs 
regarding how cause-effect relationships operate, which drives reasonable adjustments on 
the terms articulating the problem. 
 
12 John Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World 
(Boston,MA: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2000), 144. 
13 Sterman, 14–19. 
14 Sterman, 14–19. 
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Figure 1. Single- and double-loop learning processes.15 
One of the obstacles to double-loop learning is complexity.16 By defining a system 
as “complex,” Scott E. Page adds to Meadows’s definition the characteristic of 
“adaptation,”17 which gives greater dynamism to the temporal and spatial dimensions of 
the system. Cynthia Kurtz and David Snowden refer to adaptation as emergent order and 
introduce the Cynefin framework as a sense-making tool to assess problems (Figure 2).18 
The Cynefin framework offers five domains—known, knowable, complex, chaos, and 
disorder—to classify a problem under criteria that categorize the cause-effect relationships 
between the problem’s components. 
 
15 Adapted from Sterman, 16. 
16 Sterman, 20. 
17 Scott E. Page, Understanding Complexity, 1st edition (Chantilly, VA: The Teaching Company, 
2009), 9. 
18 Cynthia F. Kurtz and David J. Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-Making in a 




Figure 2. Cynefin framework.19 
Kurtz and Snowden consider that the knowable and complex domains are the only 
ones where the connections between the systems’ agents are strong, and emergent patterns 
form on their own.20 They also raise the possibility that problems can move between the 
Cynefin framework’s domains and recommend certain techniques for such end. For 
example, from complex to knowable, they affirm that “exploitation…involves the selective 
choice of stable patterns in complex space for ordered representation.”21 In this case, real-
world information is needed to identify the system’s patterns and to be applied when 
needed to adjust these patterns. This information can be equated with the connection 
established by double-loop learning between real-world feedback and mental models.  
Systems thinking and system dynamics, along with system, causal loop diagram, 
feedback, double-loop learning, and complexity are useful terms and concepts related to 
 
19 Source: Kurtz and Snowden, 468. 
20 Kurtz and Snowden, 470. 
21 Kurtz and Snowden, 477. 
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solving strategic problems and making strategic decisions. This thesis makes use of them 
in assessing the drug problem. 
B. THE DRUG PROBLEM SCOPE 
One of a system’s characteristics is hierarchy. In this regard, Meadows 
recommended not to “maximize parts of systems or subsystems while ignoring the 
whole.”22 That is why this section focuses on reviewing the drug problem in the context 
of individuals, states, and the international order. The objective is to have a broad 
understanding of the structure and feedback dynamics of the drug problem as a system. 
1. The Individual 
The association of individuals and societies with drugs has its origins in primitive 
hunter-gatherer societies that used plants for pharmacological purposes.23 After that, 
societies gradually expanded their experiences and knowledge of drugs. Marc-Antoine 
Crocq affirms that the use of psychoactive substances throughout history falls into three 
main categories: religious, medical, and recreational purposes.24 Regarding religious 
ceremonies, reference is made to the religious authorities of the original tribes and groups 
who sought hallucinogenic effects by ingesting plants and vegetables in order to 
communicate with their deities and ancestors. Medicinal use primarily refers to 
prescription or over-the-counter drugs to treat diseases and their effects, such as pain. The 
recreational use of drugs refers to their voluntary use by an individual to experience 
relaxation, alertness, or euphoria. 
The underlying factors and individual motivations leading to drug consumption are 
complex. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) points out factors that 
“at the personal level (including behavioral and mental health, neurological developments 
 
22 Meadows, Thinking in Systems, 178. 
23 “Ötzi, the man whose frozen body was recovered in the Alps in 1991, lived about 3300 years BC, 
and carried in his pouch a travel pharmacy including a polypore fungus with antibacterial and hemostatic 
properties.” Marc-Antoine Crocq, “Historical and Cultural Aspects of Man’s Relationship with Addictive 
Drugs,” Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 9, no. 4 (December 2007): 355, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC3202501/. 
24 Crocq, 355. 
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and gene variations resulting from social influences), the micro level (parental and family 
functioning, schools and peer influences) and the macro level (socioeconomic and physical 
environment) can render adolescents vulnerable to substance use.”25  
Beyond the “acceptable” use of drugs, addiction has received extensive academic 
attention. Crocq studies drugs’ potentially addictive effects and the idea of a trade-off 
between drug use and the distortion of reality as a reward, citing some factors contributing 
to addiction—including genetics.26 Furthermore, Peter Kalivas and Nora Volkow 
characterize addiction as a disease, relate the addiction to a selection process involving the 
individual’s will, and refer to the availability of drugs as a stimulus for addiction.27 
Apparently, this hypothesis has guided many of the primary efforts to solve the drug 
problem. The intention so far has been to simply reduce or deny access to the drug supply 
as a deterrence and control mechanism. 
The drug trade can also be viewed in the context of an individual, whether directly 
and indirectly participating. Direct involvement implies the individual’s participation in 
illegal conduct—like gunmen or traffickers who do so mainly to profit. Merrill Singer et 
al. assert that the people atop the drug trade are wealthy and, at the bottom, “All of the jobs 
within the illicit drug trade must be considered forms of precarious labor as a result of the 
War on Drugs, drug industry rivalries, and the lack of protections for workers from unsafe 
working conditions.”28 The study adds that collaboration can be forced by “physical 
coercion and even various forms of enslavement or by [kin-based] membership 
arrangements.”29 Eugen Dimant and Guglielmo Tosato also discuss the role corruption 
 
25 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2018 (Vienna, Austria: UNODC 
Research, 2018), 17, https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/. 
26 Crocq, “Historical and Cultural Aspects of Man’s Relationship with Addictive Drugs,” 358. 
27 Peter W. Kalivas and Nora D. Volkow, “The Neural Basis of Addiction: A Pathology of Motivation 
and Choice,” The American Journal of Psychiatry 162, no. 8 (2005): 1410, https://doi.org/10.1176/
appi.ajp.162.8.1403. 
28 Merrill Singer, William Tootle, and Joy Messerschmidt, “Living in an Illegal Economy: The Small 
Lives That Create Big Bucks in the Global Drug Trade,” The SAIS Review of International Affairs 33, no. 1 
(2013): 131, https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2013.0010. 
29 Singer, Tootle, and Messerschmidt, 132. 
10 
plays in advancing the drug trade, offering that “officials with a higher wage are less likely 
to engage in corrupt practices,” but “individuals may still take bribes due to greed.”30  
People’s indirect participation in the drug trade includes their failure to denounce 
crimes committed by DTSs. In Mexico, for example, multiple cases document that among 
the conditioning factors for indirect participation are the fear of retaliation from DTSs31 
and the population’s distrust of the authorities.32 
2. The State 
Matthias Jessen and Nicolai Von Eggers assert that the state is needed to “make 
power operational, to breathe life and legitimacy into governmental practices of whatever 
kind.”33 Government practice, society, and the international context operationalize the 
state, validate its existence, and justify the maintenance of power.34 In this section, society 
and government practices are explored from health, ethics, culture, and economic 
perspectives.  
Drug abuse and addiction are traditional sources of concern for states. Although it 
varies according to the nature and quantity of drugs ingested, intoxication induces the 
 
30 Eugen Dimant and Guglielmo Tosato, “Causes and Effects of Corruption: What Has Past Decade’s 
Empirical Research Taught Us? A Survey,” Journal of Economic Surveys 32, no. 2 (April 2018): 342, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12198. 
31 Jorge Fernandez Menendez, La Nueva Guerra: Del Chapo al Fentanilo: Cómo Cambió todo lo que 
Creíamos saber sobre el Crimen Organizado, [The New War: From El Chapo to Fentanyl] (México City: 
Grijalbo, 2020). 
32 “¿Por qué los mexicanos no denunciamos?,” [Why We Mexicans Not Denounce?] Animal Político 
(blog), March 1, 2013, https://www.animalpolitico.com/el-blog-de-causa-en-comun/por-que-los-
mexicanos-no-denunciamos/; CdE UNODC, “La Cifra Oscura y las Razones de la No Denuncia en 
México,” [The Dark Figure and the Reasons for Non-Denouncing in Mexico] Centro de Excelencia 
UNODC - INEGI (blog), December 14, 2015, https://cdeunodc.wordpress.com/2015/12/14/la-cifra-oscura-
y-los-razones-de-la-no-denuncia-en-mexico/. 
33 Mathias Hein Jessen and Nicolai von Eggers, “Governmentality and Statification: Towards a 
Foucauldian Theory of the State,” Theory, Culture & Society 37, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 66, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276419849099. 
34 Michael J. Mazarr et al., Understanding the Current International Order, Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Publications, October 19, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1598.html. 
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addict to dissociate from reality,35 making consumers a potential risk to themselves and 
society. Regarding the former, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reported 
that, from 2011 to 2017, drug poisoning deaths “outnumbered deaths by firearms, motor 
vehicle crashes, suicide, and homicide.”36 As early as 1859, John Stuart Mill questioned 
law enforcement’s role in preventing crimes and accidents related to the sale of drugs.37 
That question was answered by the prohibitionist regime in the international drug control 
conferences in Shanghai (1909) and The Hague in (1912)38 and, more recently, in the war 
on drugs. Concurrently, states have established limits on drug use.39 
Frédéric Vandenberghe opines that current societies are pluralistic and 
individualistic and that their subsystems follow laws and codes that bypass morality and 
ethics.40 From the utilitarian point of view,41 states establish standards for the equitable 
distribution of public policy. A conflict arises when a state’s utilitarian perspective 
confronts an individualistic subsystems’ pragmatic egoism.42 For example, ignoring the 
public service’s morality and ethics, corrupt government officials benefit from the 
existence of criminal subsystems willing to increase their “welfare” illegally.  
 
35 The World Health Organization identifies the clouding of consciousness and the distortions of 
thinking perception among drugs’ effects. World Health Organization, Youth and Drugs : Report of a WHO 
Study Group [Meeting Held in Geneva from 22 to 28 October 1971] (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health 
Organization, 1973), 25, https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/41030. 
36 DEA’s Strategic Intelligence Section, 2019 National Drug Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2019), 4–5, https://www.dea.gov/documents/2020/01/30/2019-national-drug-
threat-assessment. 
37 Toby Seddon, A History of Drugs: Drugs and Freedom in the Liberal Age, 1st edition (Abingdon, 
England: Routledge-Cavendish, 2010), 43. 
38 Luis Astorga, El Siglo de las Drogas [The Century of Drugs] (Barcelona, Spain: Debolsillo, 2016), 
22. 
39 See for example Elie Dolgin, “A History of Drugs on the Weight List,” Nature Medicine 18, no. 6 
(June 1, 2012): 843–843, https://doi.org/10.1038/nm0612-843. 
40 Frédéric Vandenberghe, “What’s Good about the Good Life? Action Theory, Virtue Ethics and 
Modern Morality,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2020, 13–14, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0191453720948372. 
41 Utilitarians think that the consequences relevant to the morality of their actions increase or decrease 
the well-being of all those affected, which is consistent with political discourse. See Richard Mervyn Hare, 
Objective Prescriptions, and Other Essays (New York: Clarendon Press, 1999), 156. 
42 Egoism gives moral priority to consequences that increase or diminish the agent or maker of the 
judgment’s welfare. Hare, 156. 
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The decision of people to collaborate or join a DTS is a cultural matter as well. 
Margit Tavits affirms that “willingness to engage in corrupt behavior is more likely when 
one does not define corruption as morally or situationally wrong.”43 The definition of the 
behavior as “wrong” or “right” rests in part in the system of meanings comprised in 
culture.44 Religion, as a part of culture, has been associated in different forms with the 
drug problem. Elmer Mendoza and Maria Eugenia De la O, for instance, refer to three 
Mexican figures associated with the drug problem who are broadly worshiped as saints, 
chiefly by the faithful linked to drug trafficking.45 Other literature associates religion with 
events like socio-economic transactions,46 active participation in the drug trade,47 and 
ministers’ drug consumption and pronouncements in favor of the practice’s social 
acceptance.48 The evidence indicates that the church continues to be a shareholder in the 
problem,49 and a proven source of influence in close contact with society. 
 
43 Margit Tavits, “Why Do People Engage in Corruption? The Case of Estonia,” Social Forces 88, no. 
3 (2010): 1275, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645890. 
44 Culture is a system of meanings fundamental in decision making. See Lincoln Keiser, Friend by 
Day, Enemy by Night: Organized Vengeance in a Kohistani Community, ed. George Spindler and Louise 
Spindler (Belmont, CA: Thomson Custom Publishing, 2002), 32–34; and Siamak Naficy, “Of Culture and 
Cliché: Politics and the Uses (and Abuses) of Anthropology,” Combating Terrorism Exchange 4, no. 4 
(November 1, 2014): 12. 
45 Jesús Malverde and San Nazario (or El Chayo) were drug traffickers turned into popular saints not 
recognized by the Catholic Church. Together with the fictional character of “La Santa Muerte” [The Holy 
Dead], these religious figures’ cult has also been associated with helplessness, inequality, poverty, and 
social degradation reaching intermediate points from the southern United States to Colombia. See Élmer 
Mendoza and María Eugenia de la O Martínez, “La Adjetivación de La Violencia Del Narcotráfico En La 
Cultura de México: Religión, Arquitectura, Música, Novela y Periodismo,” [The Transformation of Drug 
Trafficking Violence into an Adjective in the Culture of Mexico: Religion, Architecture, Music, Novel, and 
Journalism] in Subculturas Del Narcotráfico En América Latina., ed. Nelson González-Ortega, 1st ed. 
(Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, 2015), 201–3, https://doi.org/10.7440/j.ctt1mtz500.9. 
46 Lukasz Kamienski, Shooting Up: A Short History of Drugs and War, 1st edition (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016). 
47 Astorga, El Siglo de las Drogas, 43–44, 124–25. 
48 Orivaldo Lopes and Janaína Costa, “Drugs and Religion: Contributions to the Debate on the 
Science–Religion Interface,” Religions 9, no. 4 (2018): 1, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9040136. 
49 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2010); Pope Francis, “To Participants at the International Conference on ‘Drugs 




The Drug Trafficking Structures have filled gaps in subnational economies.50 One 
example is that of farmers who are forced to collaborate in coca, marijuana, or poppy 
cultivation and do not have the option to grow alternative crops.51 In this situation, DTSs 
provide security to the peasants and their lands to protect their own interests. These 
practices increase criminal groups’ social bases because they prove to be more effective 
employers, promoters of social mobility, and security providers than the state. DTSs’ social 
and territorial control, added to gaps in public policies, allow criminals to insert themselves 
into local political and judicial systems, undermining government credibility. This has led 
to the idea of DTSs as social orders parallel to states and ruling independently,52 which 
threatens the state’s political capital.53 
Private investment is also discouraged in regions under the control of DTSs.54 
Thus, lack of investment reduces formal labor opportunities for local populations, 
hindering social development and pushing the unemployed population to the informal 
economy, the illicit economy, or migration. At the same time, the introduction of illicit 
resources into the national and subnational economies distorts macroeconomic indicators55 
and affects currency stability.56 Finally, the drug problem also depletes state economies by 
increasing investment in public policies to fight criminal organizations or to treat 
addiction.57 
 
50 Trejo and Ley refer to “subnational regions [as areas] in the developing world where the state is 
absent and where a wide variety of informal non-state predatory groups, including OCGs [Organized 
Criminal Groups], have become dominant players.” Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley, Votes, Drugs, and 
Violence: The Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 
35. 
51 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Threat of Illicit Economies and the Complex Relations with State and 
Society,” in Organized Crime and Illicit Trade: How to Respond to This Strategic Challenge in Old and 
New Domains, ed. Virginia Comolli (London, England: Springer, 2018), 5. 
52 Trejo and Ley, Votes, Drugs, and Violence, 35. 
53 Felbab-Brown, “The Threat of Illicit Economies,” 3. 
54 GCDP, “Regulation – The Responsible Control of Drugs,” The Global Commission on Drug Policy 
(blog), September 11, 2018, 19, https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/regulation-the-
responsible-control-of-drugs. 
55 GCDP, 19. 
56 Felbab-Brown, “The Threat of Illicit Economies,” 5. 
57 Trejo and Ley, Votes, Drugs, and Violence, 41. 
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3. The International System 
The analysis of the international system, defined as “the comprehensive global 
context in which states operate,”58 is an extension of the study of the state and the 
individual.59 The international order is manifested through various mechanisms—such as 
international organizations and trade treaties.60 It is through those mechanisms that states 
display their willingness to share values, interests, norms, and institutions seeking common 
objectives such as preserving life, freedom, and the limitation of violence.61 
For example, the Global Commission on Drug Policy (GCDP) documents that, in 
2017, the United States suffered an opioid overdose epidemic that reduced the national 
average life expectancy by three years.62 This crisis was attributed to an aggressive 
marketing campaign by pharmaceutical companies that led health service providers to 
increase prescriptions for opioid painkillers without any regulation. Thus, the GCDP 
concluded that Mexican drug trafficking organizations were ultimately satisfying the 
market for fentanyl and heroin in the United States. In essence, a market issue in the United 
States led to an impact on public health in the same country and influenced the 
strengthening of Mexican criminal structures that threaten U.S. national security and 
Mexico’s public security. 
C. ADVERSARIAL INNOVATION IN THE DRUG PROBLEM 
Multiple studies review how criminal organizations react to authorities’ actions in 
a direct cause-and-effect relationship. Nieto-Gomez, by contrast, proposes a systemic 
vision, and approaches the subject crosswise and longitudinally from the stigmergy point 
 
58 Michael J. Mazarr et al., Understanding the Current International Order: Building a Sustainable 
International Order Series (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, The, 2016), 8. 
59 Waltz and Walt, Man, the State, and War, 160. 
60 Mazarr et al., Understanding the Current International Order, 10–12. 
61 Arie Marcelo Kacowicz, The Impact of Norms in International Society: The Latin American 
Experience, 1881–2001 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 45–46. 
62 GCDP, “Enforcement of Drug Laws: Refocusing on Organized Crime Elites,” The Global 
Commission on Drug Policy (blog), May 6, 2020, 27, https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/
enforcement-of-drug-laws. 
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of view.63 His study describes how criminal groups’ resilience has been forged in a 
succession of adversarial innovations forced by the WD’s punitive environment. Nieto-
Gomez argues that an authority’s’ successful policy against the drug supply chain leaves 
signs that the criminal group perceives as an invitation to evolve through a trial and error 
process until the supply chain is reestablished. Hence, this section reviews the individuals, 
states, and international system’s ability to innovate in response to the successful actions 
of DTSs. 
As stated before, the individual can be involved in the drug problem as a consumer 
or as a participant in the supply chain. Assuming that the individual is rational and free to 
choose, he or she presents a stigmergic pattern strengthening his or her resilience by 
deciding not to consume drugs, despite having them readily available. The statistics 
indicate that, in global terms, a growing number of consumers is unable to develop a 
stigmergic pattern due to the stimulation of drug availability.64 In the WD environment, 
this reflection could favor the classic measures that try to cut the drug supply; however, an 
alternative or complementary focus would be on the factors that increase individuals’ well-
being. 
In the second case—joining the drug supply chain—the resilient individual does 
not need to be employed by criminal groups to achieve his or her well-being. Yet, DTSs 
are successful in offering themselves as the best, only, or forced job opportunity for the 
individual. In this case, the prevalence or growth of criminal organizations is an indication 
that they remain strong competitors in the occupational market. While this idea could 
justify repressive measures against criminal organizations, it also implies the need for the 
economic sector to offer the individual alternative occupational options. 
 
63 Nieto-Gomez affirms that the term “stygmergy” was coined by Pierre-Paul Grasse during his 
studies on indirect stimulus-response patterns in termites. Nieto-Gomez adds that “As in the case of 
termites, stigmergic patterns influence human behavior.” See Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, “Stigmergy at the 
Edge: Adversarial Stigmergy in the War on Drugs,” Cognitive Systems Research, Special Issue of 
Cognitive Systems Research – Human-Human Stigmergy, 38 (June 1, 2016): 31–40, https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.cogsys.2015.12.005. 
64 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UN World Drug Report 2020: Executive Summary, vol. 
1 (Vienna, Austria: United Nations Publication, 2020), //wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/en/exsum.html. 
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The state’s resilience can be measured by its ability to strengthen and preserve its 
institutions and ensure society’s general well-being.65 The drug problem, recognized as a 
system of systems, is successful every time one of its components manages to avoid the 
state’s efforts to limit it. In the prohibitionist regime, most states demonstrated an 
ineffective stigmergic pattern by unsuccessfully keeping repressive actions at the center of 
their policies against the drug problem. Besides, many states have not provided their 
respective societies with the conditions and opportunities to generate alternatives to drug 
use and integration into criminal groups. Such states have not yet sufficiently strengthened 
their resilience to the innovative actions by DTS elements of the drug problem as a system. 
Philippe Bourbeau defines resilience in the international system as the adjustment 
process adopted jointly by states to face endogenous or exogenous shocks.66 The drug 
problem system’s success would be characterized by its ability to circumvent international 
order mechanisms while maintaining continuity in its characteristic set of behaviors, and 
by the DTS’s ability to operate by taking advantage of the states’ differences.67 The 
evidence demonstrates that the international order has responded inadequately to the drug 
problem to the detriment of the former’s resilience. An example is the drug classification 
disparity among UNODC,68 DEA,69 and Mexico,70 which hampers the practical 
 
65 Krüger argues that “governing complexity sits uneasily with a withdrawing neoliberal 
“nightwatchman state” but rather requires its active engagement in order to keep structures open, to 
facilitate participation, to subvert strategic selection biases, to grant capacities, and to reveal and reduce 
societal impairments as the preconditions for building resilience.” See Marco Krüger, “Building Instead of 
Imposing Resilience: Revisiting the Relationship Between Resilience and the State,” International Political 
Sociology 13, no. 1 (2019): 65, https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/oly025. 
66 Philippe Bourbeau, “Resilience and International Politics: Premises, Debates, Agenda,” 
International Studies Review 17, no. 3 (2015): 382, https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12226. 
67 GCDP, “Enforcement of Drug Laws,” 18. 
68 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Terminology and Information on Drugs, 3rd ed. (New 
York: United Nations, n.d.), vii–viii. 
69 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Drugs of Abuse: A DEA Resource Guide (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2017), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/drug_of_abuse.pdf. 
70 Mexico Government, Secretariat of Government, “Ley General de Salud [Health Law],” February 
19, 2021, Articles 234, 245, http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Documentos/Federal/html/wo11037.html. 
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alignment of international legal efforts against the drug problem, thereby generating social 
and economic problems.71  
D. BIASES AND MISCONCEPTIONS 
Toby Seddon states that “The ways in which we ‘imagine’ problems are bound up 
with the ways in which we govern them.”72 The declaration of drugs as public enemy 
number one in the 1970s brought to the fore the drug control regime that permeated most 
Western states and international organizations, leading to the WD’s punitive policies that 
came into vogue.73 So, for more than half a century, a government culture has been created 
around WD, generating a series of inferential rules—heuristics—that decision makers tend 
to resort to when faced with the problem.74 The latter reveals that the way in which 
policymakers imagine the drug problem is bounded.75 
The number of issues to be addressed and the rush for a short-term result 
overwhelm most decision makers, who resort to solutions that previous administrations 
have unsuccessfully practiced. In this process, the availability heuristic is apparent since 
the formulas that decision makers implement are their references at hand.76 The solutions 
 
71 GCDP, “Classification of Psychoactive Substances: When Science Was Left Behind,” The Global 
Commission on Drug Policy (blog), June 25, 2019, 4, https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/
classification-psychoactive-substances. 
72 Seddon, A History of Drugs, 133. 
73 The drug prohibition regime “is enshrined in United Nations Conventions and its origins can be 
traced back to an international conference on the opium trade held in Shanghai in 1909.” See Seddon, 7. 
74 From the anthropological point of view, culture forms a system of interacting meanings that 
influence decision making. See Lincoln Keiser, Friend by Day, Enemy by Night: Organized Vengeance in a 
Kohistani Community, ed. George Spindler and Louise Spindler (Belmont, CA: Thomson Custom 
Publishing, 2002); and Siamak Naficy, “Of Culture and Cliché: Politics and the Uses (and Abuses) of 
Anthropology,” Combating Terrorism Exchange 4, no. 4 (November 1, 2014): 12; Cited by Barnes, Simon 
argues that heuristics “are employed to reduce difficult mental tasks to simpler ones.” Barnes adds that 
“Although valid in some circumstances, they [heuristics] can lead to large and persistent biases with serious 
implications.” James H. Barnes, “Cognitive Biases and Their Impact on Strategic Planning,” Strategic 
Management Journal 5, no. 2 (1984): 129–37, https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050204. 
75 Sterman states that, resulting from limitations of knowledge, cognition, and time, bounded 
rationality surges because individuals find themselves overwhelmed when managing complex systems. See 
Sterman, Business Dynamics, 598. 
76 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” The 
Journal of the Operational Research Society 34, no. 3 (1983): 1124, https://doi.org/10.2307/2581328. 
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put into practice are retrievable instances that represent the most recent or ongoing example 
brought to mind.77  
On the other hand, the cultural context of the WD has also generated adjustment 
and anchoring heuristics.78 In an overconfidence bias,79 initially, the decision maker 
expects “success” as the outcome of the policy. This situation leads to ignoring the drug 
problem’s disjunctive events and underestimating the possibility of the policy’s failure.80 
In the same context, current policies have received insufficient or no adjustments in light 
of the evidence of their limited results.81 Thus, the decision maker tends to maintain the 
initial high expectation and defends the decision made because it is fashionable and 
resources have been invested in it. This practice has frequently led to a worsening of the 
problem, which is recognized, for example, by former heads of state and senior officials 
who make up the GCDP commissioner body.82 
Within the drug control regime framework, the drugs’ “evil” nature has been 
transmitted indiscriminately to those who trade them and those who consume them, 
regardless of their potential non-risk to society.83 In a slippery slope fallacy, “too many 
policymakers reinforce the idea that all people who use drugs are ‘amoral addicts,’ and all 
 
77 Tversky and Kahneman, 1127. 
78 In seeking solutions, people tend to adjust initial values generally given in the problems’ 
formulation. Anchoring refers to the fact that often the adjustments are biased toward the initial values, 
typically falling short to yield satisfactory solutions. See Tversky and Kahneman, 1128. 
79 Barnes asserts that “It [overconfidence] indicates that we often do not realize how little we know 
and how much additional information we need.” See Barnes, “Cognitive Biases and Their Impact on 
Strategic Planning,” 133. 
80 The term “disjunctive events” refer to those that (apparently) do not have any relation. In complex 
systems, “Even when the likelihood of failure in each [disjointed] component is slight, the probability of an 
overall failure can be high.” See Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgement under Uncertainty,” 1128–29. 
81 Tversky and Kahneman, 1128. 
82 On GCDP’s website, in its video presentation, several of its commissioners acknowledge that, even 
in their administrations as heads of state, the punitive efforts against the drug problem failed or were 
counterproductive. “The Global Commission on Drug Policy,” The Global Commission on Drug Policy, 
accessed February 22, 2021, https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/. 
83 For Seddon, “From the latter half of the 1960s [Neo-liberalism], the idea of certain drug users as 
threats or sources of risk to the wider community has become increasingly dominant and drug policy has 
concentrated on developing strategies and interventions.” Seddon, A History of Drugs, 97. 
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those involved in drug markets are ruthless criminal masterminds.”84 The heuristic applied 
is that of representativeness since the control regime automatically categorizes the addict 
and the drug supply chain members.85 This is one reason to which various studies attribute 
mass incarceration and the marginalization of addicted people.86 Moreover, the cognitive 
or judgmental bias of insensitivity to sample size contributes to a misunderstanding of 
data.87 For example, based on UNODC’s figures, the GCDP affirms that “the significant 
majority of drug consumption is essentially non-problematic.”88 As an alternative, the 
GCDP has proposed establishing, through scientific criteria, different degrees of disease or 
risk to society posed by addicts and criminals.89 The final objective would be to determine 
treatments for addicts and penalties for offenders proportional to those degrees of illness 
or risk. 
The drug control regime has also created misconceptions that can distort policies 
directed at the drug problem. For example, there is a narrative that the war on drugs is a 
zero-sum confrontation between authorities and individuals associated with the drug 
supply chain and, by extension, between authorities and addicts.90 The idea that the drug 
control regime is under an acceptable rule-of-law culture automatically places criminals 
and drug addicts in the position of antagonists. Siamak Naficy attributes this phenomenon 
 
84 GCDP, “The War on Drugs,” The Global Commission on Drug Policy (blog), October 6, 2017, 13, 
https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/the-war-on-drugs. 
85 Representativeness is the general tendency to determine an event’s probability as high or low based 
on the resemblance of that event with some belief or stereotype already existing in our minds. Tversky and 
Kahneman affirm that “This approach to the judgment of probability leads to serious errors, because 
similarity, or representativeness, is not influenced by several factors that should affect judgments of 
probability.” See Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgement under Uncertainty,” 1124. 
86 Tversky and Kahneman, 1124. 
87 Tversky and Kahneman, 1125. 
88 GCDP, “Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies That Work.,” The Global Commission on Drug 
Policy (blog), March 4, 2016, 11, https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/taking-control-
pathways-to-drug-policies-that-work. 
89 GCDP, “Taking Control.” 
90 “In the scholarly literature, OCGs [Organized Criminal Groups] are considered to be non-state 
actors. Because most criminologists implicitly accept Weber’s claim that the modern state aims to exercise 
the monopoly of force within given territory, criminal studies commonly assume that OCGs and the state 
have a zero-sum relation: whatever one organization wins is at the cost of the rival organization.” Trejo and 
Ley, Votes, Drugs, and Violence, 34. 
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in part to the fact that “the ‘otherness’ of the outsider, especially the enemy, serves as a 
marker we use to define ourselves and establish our own identities.”91 In the drug problem, 
by describing the enemy in his preconceived illicit culture, the authorities confirm their 
identity as government subsystems of the state defending legality. This is used to justify 
punitive policies to neutralize criminals and confine addicts. This cognitively or 
judgmentally biased view of criminals and drug addicts prevents the exploration and 
attention of the underlying causes of crime and drug addiction. 
Finally, there is the optimistic view of achieving a drug-free world. This idea is 
compatible with the WD culture’s punitive policies, because eliminating drugs would be 
like destroying an enemy of the state for soldiers. However, the WD’s systemic effects 
have been unpredictable, uncontrollable, and fatal in the worst of cases. Antonio Maria 
Costa, former executive director of UNODC, put it in these terms: “Is a drugs free world 
attainable? Probably not. Is it desirable? Most certainly, yes. Therefore, I see this slogan as 
an aspirational goal, and not as an operational target—in the same way that we all aspire 
to eliminate poverty, hunger, illiteracy, diseases, even wars.”92 
  
 
91 Naficy, “Of Culture and Cliché,” 3. 
92 Seddon, A History of Drugs, 2. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses qualitative-exploratory analysis to address the drug problem 
holistically. The first step introduced concepts related to system dynamics, depicted the 
drug problem in general terms from the perspective of classical realism’s three levels of 
study, and used the theory of resilience to contrast the adversarial relation between, on the 
one hand, the drug problem components and, on the other, the individual, the state, and the 
international system. This step also detailed the biases and misconceptions conditioning 
states’ classical approaches to address the problem. The objective of the first step was to 
broaden the reader’s vision of the drug problem through the systemic reference and to point 
out the factors that have driven the classic punitive strategies of the WD. From the new 
perspective, the second step explores the case studies of Brazil, Peru, Switzerland, and 
Mexico to illuminate the problem presented and how it was dealt with in different particular 
contexts. In the third step, the systems theory is used to specifically highlight the existing 
relationships between the various components of the drug problem in Mexico as a system. 
Causal loop diagrams depict those relationships, allowing us to identify potential leverage 
points to recommend actions that more effectively address the systemic problem. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
In this chapter, four case studies are provided as examples of different approaches 
to address the drug problem. The selected cases cover a wide spectrum of the drug problem 
by citing countries with various geographic and socio-economic conditions. The first case 
involves the Pacifying Police Units (UPP) of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, which operate in an 
urban environment. The second case focuses on the “Miracle of San Martin,” set in a rural 
Peruvian environment impacted by guerrilla groups. The third case examines Switzerland’s 
four-pillar policy in dealing with its national problem of heroin consumption. Finally, 
Mexico’s case is reviewed, where a combination of the problems observed in the three 
previous cases is found. These case studies offer a plentiful source of feedback in regards 
to the drug problem, which proves helpful later in finding leverage points when narrowing 
the focus on the causal loop diagram of Mexico’s drug problem. 
A. BRAZIL: PACIFYING POLICE UNITS 
Since the late 1960s, Brazil has experienced sustained macroeconomic growth. By 
2009, Brazil was recognized as one of five major emerging economies that also included 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS group), and in 2012, the country ranked 
sixth among the global economies.93 In 2001–2014, Brazil reduced poverty and extreme 
poverty rates by around ten percentage points. Along with this economic growth, from the 
early 2000s on, Brazil became the main shipping point for maritime cargo to markets in 
Africa and Europe, which was accompanied by an increase in Colombian cocaine 
trafficking to markets in Spain, France, and Italy.94 Among other international massive 
 
93 Enrique Vasquez, “The Paradox Between Good Economic Management And Social Unrest In 




94 Paula Miraglia, “Drugs and Drug Trafficking in Brazil: Trends and Policies,” Center for 21st 
Century Security and Intelligence Latin America Initiative, 2015, 3, http://www. brookings. edu/∼/media/
Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug policy/Miraglia–Brazil-final. pdf; United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, “Drug Supply,” in World Drug Report 2020, UNODC Research, vol. 3 (Vienna, Austria: 
United Nations Publication, 2020), 31, 34, //wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/en/drug-supply.html. 
24 
events, between 2006 and 2016, Rio de Janeiro hosted the 2007 Pan-American Games and 
the Summer Olympics.95 The economic and political interests that accompanied these 
international events forced the government of Rio de Janeiro to seek solutions to reduce 
violence. After 2008, violence in Rio de Janeiro was eventually tamped down by the 
UPPs.96 However, in 2016, violence soared again, and the UPP program was strongly 
criticized.97 This section reviews the events leading to the implementation of the UPPs and 
the evolution and results of this program. 
Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are the primary centers of the nation’s illicit drug use, 
which currently stigmatizes Brazil as the number one crack-cocaine consumer globally and 
the largest market of cocaine in South America.98 Some studies and journalistic pieces 
attribute Brazilian drug use to a plentiful supply, low cost, and commercial agreements 
between criminal organizations.99 In Rio de Janeiro, according to a 2010 demographic 
census, 763 slums—favelas—were registered, with a population of almost 1.4 million 
inhabitants, representing 22% of the total population of the metropolis.100 Since the 1980s, 
 
95 Ignacio Cano and Eduardo Ribeiro, “Old Strategies and New Approaches towards Policing Drug 
Markets in Rio de Janeiro,” Police Practice & Research 17, no. 4 (August 2016): 369, https://doi.org/
10.1080/15614263.2016.1175709. 
96 Robert Muggah, “Caught between Police and Gangs, Rio de Janeiro Residents Are Dying in the 
Line of Fire,” The Conversation (blog), September 4, 2017, http://theconversation.com/caught-between-
police-and-gangs-rio-de-janeiro-residents-are-dying-in-the-line-of-fire-83016. 
97 Cano and Ribeiro, “Old Strategies and New Approaches towards Policing Drug Markets in Rio de 
Janeiro,” 371; Robert Muggah and Ilona Szabó De Carvalho, “Fear and Backsliding in Rio,” The New York 
Times, April 15, 2014, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/opinion/fear-and-backsliding-
in-rio.html. 
98 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Socioeconomic Characteristics and Drug Use 
Disorders,” in World Drug Report 2020, UNODC Research, vol. 5 (Vienna, Austria: United Nations 
Publication, 2020), 34, //wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/en/socioeconomic.html; United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, “Drug Use and Health Consequences,” in World Drug Report 2020, UNODC Research, vol. 2 
(Vienna, Austria: United Nations Publication, 2020), 27, //wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/en/drug-use-
health.html; Anabel Hernandez, “Brasil, el Segundo Mayor Consumidor de Cocaína del Mundo, y Uno de 
los Más Violentos (Parte I),” [Brazil, the Second Largest Cocaine User in the World, and One of the Most 
Violent (Part I)] Deutsche Welle (blog), August 26, 2019, https://www.dw.com/es/brasil-el-segundo-
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50169426. 
99 Miraglia, “Drugs and Drug Trafficking in Brazil,” 3–4; Hernandez, “Brasil, Parte I.” 
100 Giuseppe Ricotta, “En el Territorio del Enemigo: Las Unidades de Policía de Pacificación (UPP) 
En Una Favela de Río de Janeiro, Brasil,” [In the Territory of the Enemy: Pacifying Police Units (UPP) in a 
Favela in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil] Antípoda : Revista de Antropología y Arqueología, no. 29 (2017): 65, 
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the vacuum in governmental leadership and the need for an alternative social order in this 
population led to the emergence of criminal gangs that took control.101  
The three prominent DTSs or “commandos” entrenched in Rio de Janeiro are the 
“Vermelho [red],” “Tercero [third],” and “amigos de los amigos [friends of friends].”102 
Within the favelas, these DTSs recruit young people seeking status, protection, and a 
decent salary, among other material benefits.103 In general, the commandos are better 
security and job providers than the government, even though the salaries they offer are not 
much higher than salaries for equivalent levels of work in the legal labor market.104  
Since the middle of the 20th century, various non-governmental institutions have 
tried to integrate the favelas into the general population.105 However, the conflicting 
traditional interests of different social groups, DTSs, and politicians have hampered this 
objective.106 The authorities’ strategies in Rio de Janeiro have gone through three stages: 
1) the original WD’s paradigm; 2) the emergence of militias; and 3) the introduction of the 
Pacifying Police Units (UPP) program.107  
The WD’s prohibitionist strategy was well suited to the Military Police’s repressive 
nature, which automatically perceived inhabitants of the favelas’ as enemies of the 
State.108 Ignacio Cano and Eduardo Ribeiro’s research reveals that the police temporarily 
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occupied the favelas, but crime returned to its original level once the police were 
withdrawn. This cycle was then repeated.109 The same study highlights the lack of crime 
prevention and investigation measures during this stage and identifies some negative 
consequences related to this neglect, such as corruption, deterioration of the police image, 
fear and distrust toward the authorities, and diversification of crime. 
In 2006, the vacuum in government control and the ineffectiveness of punitive 
policies promoted the proliferation of militia groups that sought to sell security services to 
the local population.110 As a result, militias violently seized control of some favelas from 
the commandos, and, as of 2008, militias occupied 36% of the favelas.111 Some studies 
argue that the militias were composed of corrupt elements from the security forces with 
access to police intelligence and better internal organization than the commandos.112 
While some authorities initially supported the militias,113 their abuses amounted to 
organized crime, and open support for them ceased, forcing the militias to lower their 
profile. But they maintained territorial control.114  
In 2006, the Drug Law was enacted in Brazil. Paula Miraglia explains that the law 
generated the expectation that there would be a reduction in the number of people 
imprisoned.115 Nevertheless, Miraglia concludes that the law’s vague language concerning 
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such a reduction and the resistance to change in the judicial and security cultures 
contributed to the Drug Law having the opposite effect.116  
Giuseppe Ricotta argues that the UPPs were introduced as a priority intervention 
on urban violence as part of a series of urban renewal and transformation processes.117 
Furthermore, he affirms that Rio de Janeiro ultimately sought to consolidate itself as a 
modern and functional city in light of the “mega-events” that it hosted between 2007 (XV 
Pan American Games) and 2016 (XXXI edition of the Olympic Games). Consequently, the 
UPP project had strong support from economic interests, eliminating the possibility of 
encountering resistance from the conservative political sector.118 
The original objectives of the UPPs were to regain territorial control of the favelas 
for the state, reduce violence, increase public and private investment, and improve living 
conditions.119 The permanent installation of the UPPs was preceded by an armed invasion 
of the favelas that resulted in the arrest of drug dealers and the seizure of weapons, followed 
by the deployment of forces to secure the area and monitor social activities. The first UPP 
was established in 2008, and by 2013 there were already UPPs in 38 favelas. However, 
UPPs were positioned in the favelas under control by criminal gangs but not in the favelas 
under control by the militias.120 The new policy generated optimism in the UN and the 
World Bank.121 Between 2009 and 2012, the UPPs helped to reduce the homicide rate by 
65%, but the model deteriorated after the 2016 Olympics, and crime spiked again in the 
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favelas of Rio de Janeiro.122 A poll carried out in 2014 revealed that UPPs’ popular support 
declined from 60% in 2012 to 41% in the survey year.123 
Several studies have questioned this program, equating it to counterinsurgency 
operations in the context of civil war without the intention to reinstate power over that of 
criminal organizations.124 Michael Wolff finds the ubiquitous poverty and the state’s 
ineffective presence aggravated by a lack of material resources and the police’s inability to 
supplant the functions of social and economic control of local criminal organizations.125 
Finally, Elizabeth Leeds affirms that the UPPs have not been implemented as a single 
model to guide the actions of the police as an institution.126 On the one hand, purely 
punitive operations are maintained in the areas under the control of criminal organizations. 
On the other hand, the UPPs promote social rapprochement in nearby favelas. This has 
failed to demonstrate a policing philosophy that suppresses the WD culture. 
B. PERU: THE SAN MARTIN MIRACLE 
Peru has traditionally been one of the major coca leaf producers in the world since 
the cocaine boom in the illicit drug market in the 1970s.127 Of the total coca plantations in 
Peru, in 2004, the UNODC estimated that 34% were in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) 
region,128 an environment complicated by the presence of subversive groups in addition 
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to the classic DTSs. In one department of the UHV, however, the confluence of several 
factors led to the eradication of coca leaf crops in what has been known as “The San Martin 
Miracle.” 
At the beginning of the 1960s, the Peruvian government began to populate (through 
incentivized relocation) the UHV in the departments of San Martin and Huanuco to 
alleviate migratory pressure in the coastal cities and take advantage of the agricultural 
potential of the area.129 The project had international funding under the U.S. Alliance for 
Progress program.130 Hernan Manrique notes that although the area was populated, the 
project failed due to several factors.131 The first of them was that the population did not 
receive the basic services required such as health, education, and security. The second 
factor was the centralized imposition of agricultural activities and cooperative 
mechanisms, which did not address local interests and concerns and were therefore not 
accepted by the settlers. The third was the low profitability of the crops due to significant 
price fluctuations and the lack of markets. Eventually, direct investment in the region was 
cut. In the mid-1970s, the ecological balance in the area deteriorated due to poor urban and 
agricultural planning.132 Other unintended consequences from this project were local 
indebtedness and a culture of dependence on the state.133 
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During this period, the settlers discovered the advantages of the coca leaf’s 
cultivation.134 The coca plant supports three to six harvests per year, yielding profits at ten 
times the earnings from cocoa cultivation and 91 times that of rice. An additional benefit 
was that the drug traffickers collected the coca leaf directly from the field, saving farmers 
the traditional cost of transporting their products to market for sale. These factors started 
the cocaine boom and promoted the emergence of representatives of the coca-grower trade 
unions. Guided by the United Nations (UN) and prohibitionist policies, the Peruvian 
government’s response between 1978 and 1989 was police repression intended to eliminate 
coca and cocaine production.135 In parallel, an organization was created to promote 
alternative agricultural development; however, this organization lacked coordination with 
the police, driving inefficiencies and distancing the population from the authorities. 
The Shining Path (SP) guerrilla movement also appeared between 1983 and 1984. 
According to Vanda Felbab-Brown, SP initially prohibited coca leaf trafficking, which was 
not well received by the local population, but SP understood the peasants’ dependence on 
the coca trade for subsistence.136 By 1986 the guerrilla group controlled the region and 
participated in all phases of the coca market, expanding its social base and its criminal, 
economic, and political capital. SP’s strength imposed on the authorities and drug 
traffickers, and led to an attempt by the Tupac Amaru Movement to penetrate its territory 
in the same activities.  
Perhaps the SP’s influence reached its peak in 1989 when the government’s use of 
herbicides to eradicate coca plants provoked the anger of traffickers and coca growers 
alike, which the guerrilla group used to motivate them to attack a police post. According 
to Felbab-Brown, the episode resulted in “one of the Peruvian government’s worst defeats 
in the UHV.”137 In this period, the U.S. Department of State and the Department of 
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Defense and the Drug Enforcement Agency actively participated with the Peruvian 
authorities in eradication operations and law enforcement against drug trafficking 
activities.138 In 1988, the United States built a base in the conflict zone, installing an 
airfield, helicopter maintenance facilities, and housing.139 
Pablo Dreyfus has mentioned that, in the decade of the 1980s, there were two 
periods in which the UHV was declared an emergency zone, resulting in occupation by 
strong military contingents.140 During these periods, the military commanders focused on 
fighting the guerrilla movement and restricted their eradication and interdiction activities, 
while promoting rural infrastructure construction. These measures regained the peasants’ 
sympathy for and collaboration with the government to a certain extent, leading to the 
temporary withdrawal of social and political capital and territory from SP. Nevertheless, 
this strategy was accompanied by brutal attacks against the guerrilla group, often ignoring 
human rights, and unintentionally facilitated the development of drug trafficking groups. 
Moreover, Dreyfus documents that the military forces received bribes from drug traffickers 
in exchange for protection against the police forces deployed in the UHV.141 
Felbab-Brown identifies several factors that locally contributed to the elimination 
of the SP guerrilla group.142 The military authorities openly denied any support to the 
police in eradication activities, which eliminated the peasants’ dependence on SP to protect 
their plantations since the coca growers and drug traffickers were enough to do so. As a 
result, the SP resorted to repressive practices to maintain the population’s support, which 
further resulted in its loss of political capital. The people reacted by creating self-defense 
units that provided intelligence information to the counter-guerrilla military forces. Finally, 
in a joint intelligence effort between the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 
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Peruvian government, in 1992, SP’s leader was captured, essentially putting an end to the 
movement at the national level. 
The Peruvian policy to address the drug problem in UHV changed in 1989, laying 
the foundations for the so-called “Miracle of San Martin.” Manrique describes the factors 
that came together in addressing the problem.143 On the operational side, the coca growers 
were no longer the target of state intervention, with the main effort concentrated on the 
guerrillas.144 On the one hand, the SP leader’s capture and the local intelligence 
information provided by the self-defense groups accelerated the subversive units’ 
dismantling. On the other hand, an air interdiction strategy was developed affecting drug 
trafficking structures, but not coca growers. Socially, the soldiers generated close contact 
with the population. Circumstantially, a fungus’s appearance impacted the coca 
plantations, wiping out 40% of the UHV crops. These factors motivated the transfer of 
crops to other valleys, and Colombia eventually displaced Peru as the main producer of 
coca. In the end, coca depreciated in the UHV, and alternative development programs had 
greater penetration among peasants, were favored by UN and U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) international support programs, and led to solid alliances being 
established between the state and civil society. 
As of 2002, the coca leaf has recovered its price; nevertheless, according to 
Manrique, the San Martin region consolidated the project’s sustainability.145 Manrique’s 
research identified several factors contributing to this result. The first was the defeat in 
local elections of the political organizations associated with the local coca leaf-growers 
union. The new San Martin mayor’s office established alliances at the local, state, and 
central levels for alternative crop development. The second factor was the implementation 
of support programs by the UN, USAID, NGOs, and other national and international 
governmental institutions, which led to incorporating traditional unions and creating new 
private companies and value chains. Peasants were then incorporated into coca crop 
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eradication programs and presented with profitable, safer, and violence-free alternatives. 
The third factor was reduced centralized interference in the programs. The peasants had 
greater participation in the decisions related to the design and implementation of the 
alternative programs. Finally, the local party’s triumph in the elections of 2006 
consolidated the projects’ autonomy through strategies to improve the road network and 
the promotion of licit crops going to national and international markets. 
The strategies’ that proved successful in San Martin, however, were not extended 
to other departments of Peru.146 Hugo Cabieses points out the deficiencies of the Peruvian 
government’s strategies in other regions.147 These shortfalls included the absence of 
preliminary economic-ecological studies, poor participation in the programs by the local 
population and authorities, the creation of local markets in areas not suitable for mono-
production and agriculture export, and poor sustainability of plans, programs, and projects. 
C. SWITZERLAND: THE FOUR-PILLAR POLICY 
Switzerland began recognizing illegal drug use and addiction as problems in the 
1960s. Motivations for individuals to abuse drugs in Switzerland have been attributed to 
the reaffirmation of identity, protest, or stress release.148 As the problem’s visibility 
suddenly increased, it attracted interest in the political and social fields.149 In response, 
homeless shelters and therapeutic facilities were opened, and doctors began prescribing 
methadone as a substitute for heroin use.150 A 1924 law on illicit drugs was revised in 
1975 due to the problematic social conditions generated by consumption at the national 
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level.151 The law resulted in the development of prohibitive policies and repressive 
measures taken against drug traffickers and users.152 The Cantons—administrative entities 
grouped by the Swiss Federation—were responsible for the interventions in the social and 
health areas, while the federal government was limited to financing education for 
prevention and treatment of drug abuse.153 Nonetheless, because the government’s 
ultimate goal was to achieve total abstinence among drug abusers, many of these users 
refused treatment, and the problem expanded.154 
In the 1980s, there was an alarming growth in HIV / AIDS infections among those 
who injected drugs, and the virus was then spread through sexual transmission to many 
non-drug users.155 In addition to this, Harald Klingemann describes the emergence of 
significant social and security problems that grew from the “Zurich youth revolution” and 
student mobilization, which in turn attracted international DTSs’ to places where drug users 
gathered to consume.156 In response, some cities allowed open drug use in “needle parks,” 
so the police could observe and control criminal activities in a central location. Predictably, 
these sites achieved worldwide notoriety, and their deteriorating conditions negatively 
affected Switzerland’s international image. The so-called needle parks were closed in 1992 
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under public pressure,157 resulting in users moving to abandoned sites where conditions 
worsened, further increasing violence and clashes between gangs.158 
Social and health management of the problem developed from the initial therapeutic 
shelters and communities at the cantonal level. Klingeman’s studies found that, in the 
1980s, drug users were offered two types of programs.159 Residential programs 
materialized in detoxification centers and psychiatric clinics intending to help clients 
achieve abstinence. Non-residential programs—considered aid-for-survival, low-
threshold, harm-reduction programs—were publicly funded to reach heavy users. Despite 
not being authorized at the federal level, treatment of heroin addiction in methadone 
prescription clinics was tolerated by the cantons. In 1992, under pressure from different 
entities in the political, scientific, and social sectors, the federal government authorized 
pilot prescription programs drawing on the experience of cities such as Zurich and Bern. 
As documented by Riaz Khan et al., the interest the problem had generated in 
political, cultural, and non-governmental circles at the national level developed more 
rigorous studies.160 The Cantonal government sent experts to the United Kingdom to 
investigate alternative prescription practices for heroin in its traditional form and the novel 
form of smokable heroin. For its part, the Sub-commission on Drug Issues of the Federal 
Narcotic Commission financed studies to review all the international experience regarding 
the prescription of narcotics and to design scientific research on the subject. The sub-
commission concluded that the harm reduction approach to the drug problem was the best 
model for Switzerland. 
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In 1994, as a result of a legislative process that included referendums, the 
government identified prevention, therapy, risk reduction, and law enforcement as the four 
pillars of its national drug strategy.161 Other measures were added to the original project 
“such as drug treatments using prescription heroin.”162 In 1995 the four-pillars policy was 
enacted.163 This policy did not decriminalize the trade and consumption of drugs but 
recognized that addicts continue to have rights despite their marginalized status. Two 
alternatives to the four-pillar policy have been voted on in referendums: in 1997, a 
repressive-preventative policy and in 1998, a legalization alternative.164 The alternative 
proposals promoted by conservative factions were rejected by more than two-thirds of the 
popular vote. In November 2008, a Swiss referendum was approved by 68% in favor of 
ratifying a federal law on narcotics, which “finally established in legislation the principle 
of ‘four pillars.’”165 
In addition to the alternative proposals promoted by conservatives, the Swiss four-
pillars drug policy has encountered other resistance and detractors both at the national and 
international level. For example, Joanne Csete documents the police and judicial system’s 
initial resistance to implementing the policy’s measures. This resistance was overcome by 
including the police and judicial representatives in the federal council’s discussions to 
evaluate results and develop strategies.166  
At the international level, a group of experts charged with verifying the policy’s 
compliance with UN conventions recommended that the World Health Organization 
(WHO) evaluated the “controversial experiment” of heroin-assisted therapy (HAT).167 
The WHO concluded the positive medical feasibility and health, social, and criminal 
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benefits of the HAT. Nevertheless, because of the design of the trial, the evaluation was 
inconclusive in contrasting the HAT benefits to alternative therapies. The UN group of 
experts pronounced the WHO study results “inadequate to justify any such initiatives by 
other governments,” adding that other countries could not easily replicate the financial 
means made available to the Swiss government. The Swiss Federal Department of Public 
Health defines the four-pillars drug policy as follows: 
Prevention helps to reduce drug use by preventing people from starting to 
use drugs and developing dependency.... Therapy helps to reduce drug use 
by enabling people to overcome dependency or at least by keeping this 
option realistic for them in the future.... Harm reduction helps to lower the 
negative consequences of drug consumption on the users themselves and 
indirectly also on society, by making possible a consumption that is less 
problematic both to the individual concerned and to society.... Law 
enforcement helps to reduce the negative impact of drug use on society by 
using the appropriate regulatory measures to enforce the ban on illegal 
drugs.168 
Ambros Uchtenhagen argues that since the implementation of the four-pillars 
policy in 1991, there has been a reduction in deaths due to overdose by 50%; incidence of 
initial heroin use by 80%; HIV infections by 65%; drug-related urban delinquency; 
annoyances by the open drug scenes; and finally, the public visibility of the drug 
problem.169  
D. MEXICO: THE WAR ON DRUGS 
Mexico’s first prohibitionist policies resulted from the international conferences on 
drugs in Shanghai in 1909 and The Hague in 1912.170 In 1926, prohibition included 
marijuana and opium, and consumers and traders began to be seen as criminals.171 In 1931, 
drug trafficking and drug addiction were declared federal crimes.172 By the 1930s, 
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merchants began to amass large fortunes with the illicit business, and some of them entered 
politics to be more successful. Luis Astorga asserts the drug trade was born structurally 
linked to politics and not as a parallel or autonomous power.173  
The Mexican marijuana business began after World War I, giving birth to the 
international organizations for drug trafficking.174 After the Mexican revolution (1910–
1919), the government imposed a corporatist model in agriculture in which the peasant 
population was integrated into the state party’s vertical structure,175 which suggests that 
marijuana and poppy cultivation was politically tolerated. The boom in the trafficking of 
Mexican opium and its derivatives began in World War II when poppy-producing areas in 
Asia fell under the control of the Axis countries, and the U.S. pharmaceutical industry 
required supply alternatives.176 That said, there is no knowledge of a formal agreement 
with the United States promoting the proliferation of crops in Mexico.177 In 1947, the anti-
drug campaigns, initially directed by health authorities, passed under the control of the 
Attorney General’s Office.178  
With U.S. support to the Mexican government, in 1977, the Condor operation 
deployed more than 10,000 soldiers in the Golden Triangle—a rural area on the limits of 
the states of Chihuahua, Durango, and Sinaloa—in coordination with the Attorney General 
of the Republic (PGR). Astorga has written of some novel social and criminal responses to 
government actions targeting the drug problem.179 For example, the strategy caused the 
exodus of peasants to the cities, revealing that approximately 30% of the Sinaloan 
municipality of Badiraguato depended on drug trafficking. Astorga has also documented 
that, in the Sinaloan agricultural fields in the 1980s, drug crop pickers earned up to seven 
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174 Astorga, 35. 
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and a half times more daily wages than a laborer in licit crops.180 Moreover, Guillermo 
Trejo and Sandra Ley affirm that, through the Condor operation, “members of the Federal 
Security Directorate (DFS) … conducted a major reorganization of the drug trafficking 
industry.”181 Supposedly assisted by DFS’s officials, the druglords moved to other states 
and purchased real estate in the southwestern United States.182  
In the last two decades of the 20th century, the interest and statistical foundation of 
studies on the drug problem became more pronounced in the media than in the 
governmental and scientific fields.183 This situation emanated from, for example, the fact 
that the investigations into the kidnapping and murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena in 
1985 were guided mainly by North American agencies rather than Mexican authorities’ 
data. Astorga adds that this event was salient because it fully documented and revealed the 
penetration of DTSs in Mexican political and business circles and strengthened the social, 
economic, political, and cultural conditions promoting the drug business. 
Starting in 1989, opposition political organizations began to win popularly elected 
positions in state governorships and the legislative branch, eventually winning the Mexican 
presidency in 2000.184 The democratic transition broke the “rules of the game” established 
and respected for many years among state governments, federal representations in the 
states, and criminal structures.185 This led to conflicts among the criminal structures.186 
As a result, DTSs created armed groups to defend and expand their territory.187 Media and 
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Mexican authorities maintain that the gun supply for those armed groups had its origins in 
the United States.188  
The 2006 presidential succession marked the start of the confrontation between the 
DTSs and the Mexican security forces that fully involved the military. Trejo and Ley opine 
that “By declaring war on the country’s drug cartels, the president was hoping to shift 
public opinion away from the polarizing post-election crisis toward the country’s rising 
security crisis.”189 Benjamin Lessing argues that the Mexican authorities used the civil 
wars to advance their objectives of “crushing armed opposition, restoring the rule of law, 
and establishing a monopoly on the use of force.”190 The DTSs, however, were unwilling 
to let the state’s power grow at the cost of the influence they had come to exert with the 
pre-democratization regime.191 
At the Mexican government’s request, in 2007, the Merida Initiative was 
inaugurated.192 The U.S. government channeled resources to the Mexican government’s 
anti-drug and law assistance programs focusing on counternarcotics, border security and 
counterterrorism, public security, and institution building. The strategy worked in terms of 
neutralizing key DTSs’ members and fragmenting large parts of the DTS criminal 
structure. 
Lessing explains that in 2006–2012 the federal government started the cartel-state 
conflict.193 Trejo and Ley highlight the diversification of the criminal activity of the DTSs 
during this phase, which included crimes such as kidnapping, extortion, and illegal 
extraction of natural resources such as timber and mining.194 This expansion of activities 
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increased the intervention of DTSs in politics at the municipal level—sometimes through 
the murder of candidates—to secure continuity in financing their criminal activities. 
Furthermore, the increase in drug consumption since 2008 could suggest that the 
distribution of drugs that intensified in the areas under the control of the DTSs was a means 
of financing their armed groups.195 
Most studies attribute the increase in violence rates to the federal government’s 
strategy in the cartel-state conflict. For example, Jason Lindo and Maria Padilla studied the 
effects of the arrests of relevant members of the DTSs—the kingpin approach—on the 
levels of violence in the 2008–2011 period.196 The study found that the kingpin strategy 
increased the homicide rate by 80% in the municipality where criminals were captured and 
up to 30% in neighboring municipalities controlled by the affected DTS.197  
Other authors describe additional factors driving violence. For instance, Gerardo 
Hernandez cites the inability of the federal government to reduce the causes of violence 
and to provide security, and the unwillingness of state governments to assume their share 
of responsibility for the strategy.198 David Shirk and Joel Wallman found a correlation 
between increasing violence in Mexico and periods of decreased throughput of cocaine 
from Colombia, which increased the cost of the alkaloid and fueled intercartel conflicts to 
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control the drug trade.199 In 2011, the Merida initiative expanded its scope to include 
programs for human rights, border security, and education to “address root causes of 
violence, reduce drug demand, and build a ‘culture of lawfulness’.”200 Despite the 
initiative, the homicide rate at the national level continued to rise,201 and the public 
perception of corruption increased.202 
According to a report by the National Commission against Addictions (CONADIC) 
of the Health Secretariat, Mexico has a strategy based on “prevention, timely detection, 
and treatment of use, abuse, and dependence on psychoactive substances.”203 Yet, the 
report also states that “there is a lack of a systematic and permanent record of the 
institutions and preventive programs carried out in the country, particularly those 
developed by civil society organizations.”204 Additionally, Felbab-Brown opines that, 
“Given the poor quality and capacities of drug treatment centers in Mexico, the spread of 
drug abuse will coincide with a significant decrease in public health and increase in the 
deadly rate of overdose.”205 
At the beginning of the 2018–2024 presidential period, the creation of a National 
Guard and the view that the armed forces were a central resource to suppress violence 
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received strong criticism.206 Felbab-Brown opines that the Mexican government “has not 
yet managed to effectively operationalize an alternative law enforcement strategy.”207 
Besides, as June Beittel has observed, the popular perception of safety in Mexico declined 
in the first months of 2020.208  
Regarding criminal groups, the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports 
that the fragmentation of the large DTSs “has made the crime situation diffuse and the 
crime groups’ behavior harder to suppress or eradicate.”209 The CRS documents that 
during the COVID 19 pandemic, criminal groups continued to generate violence due to 
territorial disputes. In its analysis, the CRS also asserts that Mexico continues to be an 
important source of heroin, marijuana, and synthetic drugs such as methamphetamines and 
fentanyl, while also providing the main route of access for cocaine from South America. 
The study concludes that synthetic drugs, especially fentanyl, are gradually replacing 
marijuana and heroin, which will probably reduce the profitability of marijuana and poppy 
cultivation, affecting farmers who cultivate those crops as a means of subsistence.210 
In his FY2021 “drug majors” determination, U.S. President Donald Trump 
criticized the Mexican government’s performance in its anti-drug efforts.211 Nonetheless, 
the U.S. State Department authorized $159 million in the FY2021 Consolidated 
Appropriations Act to accounts that fund the Merida initiative.212 Felbab-Brown has 
published that the U.S. government stance on the drug problem—released on April 1, 
2021—centers on “treatment, prevention, and harm reduction.”213 Regarding drug supply, 
Felbab-Brown adds that United States is currently seeking to partner with countries like 
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Colombia and Mexico in “deepening bilateral cooperation on public health approaches, 
expanding effective state presence, developing infrastructure, and ensuring respect for the 
rule of law and human rights in drug policy responses.”214 The publication recognizes that 





V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
In the second chapter of this thesis, the general dynamics of the drug problem were 
described. Chapter IV reviewed more specific dynamics conditioned by the particularities 
of the affected countries and their strategies to deal with the problem. Both chapters make 
it possible to identify the key variables and relevant feedback loops of the drug problem, 
which the CLDs depict in this chapter. In the first section, the Cynefin framework and 
double-loop learning are used to acquire situational awareness of the drug problem. In the 
second section, the CLD of the drug problem is presented, and its main variables and 
feedback are described, using tools of Social Networks Analysis to assess their relative 
importance. In the third section, the CLD of the drug problem in Mexico is discussed, and 
potential leverage points are identified, offering potential strategies to address the problem. 
A. MAKING SENSE OF THE DRUG PROBLEM 
As stated in Chapter II, the knowable and complex domains of the Cynefin 
framework are the only ones where emergent patterns form on their own. This affirmation 
is consistent with the drug problem as evidenced, among other examples, by the militias’ 
emergence in the case of Brazil, the structural changes in the DTSs in Mexico, or the 
emigration of coca crop producers outside the department of San Martin in the case of Peru. 
In its initial state, however, the drug problem is in the complex domain. Initially, cause-
effect feedbacks in the drug problem can only be understood with hindsight and by 
applying particular perspectives of the time and place in which they are analyzed. 
Additionally, these feedbacks are non-linear in nature and therefore not predictably 
repeatable. The drug problem in the complex domain has historically generated behaviors 
that have been only temporarily managed. Brazil and Mexico represent cases where 
governments have temporarily reacted to the problem in a probe-sense-respond process. 
Consequently, these countries’ attempts to solve the problem have increased the resilience 
of the members of the drug supply chain while the governments have been unable to 
strengthen the resilience of the policies they have implemented. Brazil and Mexico 
continue to manage the drug problem in a complex domain. 
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The case studies from Switzerland and Peru illustrate the possibility of moving the 
drug problem from the complex to the knowable domain by applying systems thinking. 
Switzerland’s experiences gathered between the 1970s and the 1990s—including punitive 
policies—allowed this country to identify the system’s behavior. With this holistic 
understanding of the problem, Swiss policy considered strategies to address each of the 
components (or pillars), anticipating their feedbacks’ impact on the overall behavior of the 
system. Peru’s case shows how investment in alternative crops, the establishment of 
commercial networks for crop products, and decentralized freedom in decision making 
were planned and applied “Just-in-time” to the specific scenario of the Department of San 
Martin’s problem. In both countries, problem management in the knowable domain has 
allowed them to apply a reductionist sense-analyze-respond procedure. 
Single and double-loop learning processes also prove useful in the making sense of 
the policies attending the drug problem, when we are tracing the analogous situations with 
the WD and Switzerland’s four-pillars policy, respectively (Figure 3).215 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of the WD and the four-pillars policy in the learning 
process 
 
215 Adapted from: Sterman, Business Dynamics, 19. 
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Consistent with the single-loop learning process, the prohibitionist model led to the 
operating and decision rules comprising the WD. An example of these rules are laws 
indiscriminately criminalizing all addicts and drug-supply chain members. The decision 
then is to apply punitive policies in the real world. And the resulting number of deaths 
associated with organized crime is the classic measurement of feedback effectiveness for 
the reduction of violence and by which the strategy is adjusted. Using single loop learning, 
the WD’s resulting adjustment is a greater investment in the security forces’ warfighting 
capacity and increased deployments of forces—like Mexico’s operation Condor or 
Brazilian UPPs—that have failed to achieve a sustained reduction in violence rates or have 
worsened the problem.  
By contrast, Switzerland’s case shows the application of double-loop learning. This 
strategy resulted from the establishment of a bridge between the feedback from reality and 
the mental model. Studies carried out in the late 1980s collected national and international 
data from the real world. Consequently, decisions were gradually adjusted based on 
measurements of reality and changes in the rules—Four-Pillars Policy—as a mental model 
adjustment product. Sterman has asserted that, “As our mental models change we change 
the structure of our systems, creating different decision rules and new strategies.”216 
Changes in the system’s structural perceptions redefine its proper limits and understandings 
of cause-effect relationships, which drive reasonable adjustments to articulate the 
problem.217 For example, in Switzerland, the consumer was no longer considered a 
criminal and was treated for an illness. This change allowed anti-drug policies in that 
country—initially bounded by the WD culture to the area of law enforcement—to be 
extended to the areas of prevention, therapy, and harm reduction. Still, consistent with the 
double-loop learning process, the strategy is flexible. The four-pillar drug policy 
recognizes that the specific actions derived from it are the product of constant review and 
adaptation.218 
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B. THE DRUG PROBLEM AS A SYSTEM 
This section describes and analyzes the structure of the drug problem system based 
on its CLD. The objective is to describe the different feedback loops and to evaluate the 
variables’ relevance based on their frequency of appearance in the different CLDs’ loops. 
In addition, a network built from the system variables is analyzed, using social network 
analysis metrics to confirm the impact of the variables on the system’s behavior in general. 
1. Structure and Feedback Loops 
Drawing on the information in Chapters II and IV, Figure 4 depicts 20 variables 
and 34 feedback loops found in the drug problem in general. 
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Figure 4. Causal loop diagram of the drug problem.219 
The emergence of the illegal drug supply chain is due to the existence of an illicit 
consumer market, as documented by the experience of Mexico in the first half of the 20th 
century. Additionally, the drug supply chain benefits from the lack of legal alternatives to 
acquiring drugs, as occurred in the opioid overdose epidemic in the United States in 2017. 
 
219 All Causal Loop Diagrams in this thesis were created using the software ISEE Systems, Stella 
Architect ®. 
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The case of Mexico also shows that the need facilitating the emergence of the drug supply 
chain promotes the emergence of DTSs and the economy of illegal drug supply. The 
economic power generated by the illicit drug supply chain offers sufficient resources to 
bribe corrupt officials, as well as to pay the members of the supply chain workforce. 
Specifically, it offered a source of subsistence to the farmers producing coca leaves—in 
Peru—and poppy and marijuana—in Mexico. This economic capacity allows DTSs to offer 
higher salaries than the formal labor market, as documented in the cases of Brazil, Peru, 
and Mexico, so the illicit economy offers more attractive jobs than the government and 
private industry. Additionally, the illicit economy reduces the government’s possibilities 
of collecting taxes, affecting the state’s economic capacity. 
In turn, corruption also favors the emergence of the DTSs and other criminal 
groups, such as the militias in Brazil and the self-defense groups in Peru and Mexico. 
Specifically, the Brazilian case also shows that the emergence of DTSs and other criminal 
groups increases the availability of drugs to society, which encourages consumption. 
Another factor contributing to drug abuse is social anxiety, which, as documented 
by the UNODC, can be caused by socioeconomic factors, such as lack of security and job 
opportunities. For its part, the government’s failure to provide security increases due to the 
lack of its investment in law enforcement and its subsequent inability to control criminal 
activities and conflicts perpetrated by the DTSs. This lack of security, in turn, deters private 
investment and international and NGOs, which inhibits the generation of legitimate jobs or 
alternatives for subsistence. The lack of jobs is further aggravated by the lack of local 
investment from national and subnational governments given their budgetary limitations; 
likewise, there is insufficient professional and technical training due to a deficient 
education system suffering from inadequate government funding. In turn, poor education 
empowers the normalization of the culture of illegality. 
In addition to limiting the availability of professional and skilled labor, social and 
academic educational deficiencies can lead to poor individual identity formation and social 
discontent. The last two variables mentioned are factors that increase the individual’s 
proclivity for drug abuse, as shown by the case of Switzerland between the 1970s and 
1990s. Another causal factor of social discontent is the lack of policies for the efficient 
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supply of basic services—such as water, sewerage, and electricity—also limited by 
government budget restrictions. 
Finally, economic weakness aggravates the lack of health programs and precludes 
the possibility of offering drug alternatives as a therapeutic measure. The first variable—
lack of health programs—increases a society’s proclivity for illegal drug use, while the 
second—lack of options to acquire drugs—strengthens the emergence of illicit drug supply 
chains. 
The different combinations of the variables and feedback making up the structure 
of the drug problem system generate 34 reinforcing loops schematized in the Appendix and 
summarized in Table 1.  








































































































































































































































































01. Corruption 1 1    1    1   1   1 1    
02. Corruption & availability-driven consumption 1 1 1 1 1             1   
03. Corruption & lack of security-driven consumption 1 1 1  1   1          1 1  
04. Drugs availability-driven consumption  1 1 1 1                
05. Drug supply competition   1      1 1       1 1   
06. Education-DTSs emergence  1 1  1 1 1   1   1    1    
07. Education-illegality culture      1    1   1   1 1    
08. Education-illicit economy   1  1  1   1   1    1 1   
09. Education-investment  1 1  1 1 1 1  1  1 1 1   1    
10. Education-Social anxiety  1 1  1 1    1  1 1    1  1  
11. Education-unemployment      1    1  1 1    1    
12. Health programs-DTSs emergence  1 1  1 1    1 1      1    
13. Health programs-illicit economy   1  1     1 1      1 1   
14. Health programs-Investment  1 1  1 1  1  1 1 1  1   1    
15. Illegality culture & drug availability 1 1 1 1 1     1   1   1 1 1   









































































































































































































































































17. Illegality culture & social anxiety 1 1 1  1   1  1   1   1 1 1 1  
18. Lack of security-driven consumption  1 1  1   1           1  
19. Lack of security-Illegal workforce  1 1  1 1  1  1       1  1  
20. Legal drug supply-DTSs emergence  1 1   1   1 1       1    
21. Legal drug supply-Investment  1 1   1  1 1 1  1  1   1    
22. Private investment      1  1  1  1  1   1    
23. Private investment- DTSs emergence  1 1  1 1  1  1  1  1   1  1  
24. Social anxiety-illegal economy   1  1     1  1 1    1 1 1  
25. Social disagreement-DTSs emergence  1 1  1 1    1   1    1   1 
26. Social disagreement-illicit economy   1  1     1   1    1 1  1 
27. Social disagreement-Lack of security  1 1  1 1  1  1  1 1 1   1   1 
28. Social policies-DTSs emergence  1 1  1 1    1     1  1   1 
29. Social policies-illicit economy   1  1     1     1  1 1  1 
30. Social policies-investment  1 1  1 1  1  1  1  1 1  1   1 
31. Unemployment-driven consumption  1 1  1   1    1  1     1  
32. Unemployment-DTSs emergence  1 1  1 1    1  1     1  1  
33. Unemployment-illicit economy   1  1     1  1     1 1 1  
34. Workforce competition      1    1  1     1    
Variables’ frequency in the different loops 6 23 29 3 26 19 3 13 3 29 3 15 14 9 3 5 29 12 11 6 
2. Relevance of the Variables 
Figure 5 depicts the frequencies with which the variables are integrated into the 
loops of the CLD. The graph shows that three variables appear in 29 of the 34 (85%) loops 
of the system. The first is the economic solidity of the governments as a variable 
conditioning the financing of programs involved in the drug problem. The second is the 
lack of governmental incomes via taxes as a variable influencing the economic soundness 
of governments. The opinion of the WHO regarding the infeasibility of most countries to 
implement treatments against addiction, such as those included in the four-pillars policy of 
Switzerland, suggests the importance of maintaining an economy that allows investment 
in programs to confront the drug problem. The third variable most frequently considered 
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in the system’s loops is the emergence of illegal drug supply chains as an effect of illicit 
drug use and the lack of controlled alternatives for drug acquisition. 
 
Figure 5. Variable’s frequency in the loops of the drug problem system 
The following two variables, illegal drug consumption and the emergence of DTSs, 
appear in 26 of the 34 (76.5%) and in 23 (67.6%) of the system’s loops, respectively. 
Coincidentally, these two variables are the focus of prohibitionist practices. Besides, the 
first is a cause and the second an effect of the emergence of the drug supply chains 
mentioned previously among the most frequent variables in the system’s loops. The WD 
is intended to change the cycles associated with these variables in order to disrupt the drug 
supply chains and change the system’s behavior. Nonetheless, as has already been 
discussed, the prohibitionist approach has had poor results. Supported by its solid financial 
system, the Swiss government focused its efforts on the variable of illegal drug 
consumption, changing the prohibitionist perspective to reduce the problems associated 
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with heroin use. This change shifted the polarity of the cycles associated with these 
variables and modified the system’s impact on associated variables such as lack of security. 
Intervening in 19 loops, the illegal economy workforce is the last of the variables 
present in more than half of the system’s loops (55.9%). The case of Peru highlights the 
importance of this variable. In the San Martin region, after the fall in coca leaf prices and 
the plague of the crops in the late 1980s, the farmers originally dedicated to the cultivation 
of coca leaves accepted the implementation of alternative crops. Additionally, these 
conditions were also used to introduce governmental and non-governmental financing, 
which confirms the importance of the availability of resources to materialize programs that 
offer employment alternatives to the members of the drug supply chain. 
As one of the causes of the illegal economy workforce, the lack of legal 
employment opportunities intervenes in 44.1% of the system’s loops (15 out of 34). This 
variable was also noted in the Peruvian case. The licit cultivation alternative to coca leaf 
generated job opportunities for the peasant workforce and reversed the polarity of the 
feedback between these variables, changing the general behavior of the system and 
eradicating the cultivation of coca leaves in San Martin. 
Social and academic education intervenes in 14 loops of the system, representing 
41.2% of the total. The participation of Swiss society in the referendums allowed by its 
political system—and the relatively small size of its population—also implies the value of 
knowledge of the fundamentals of national problems through formal education and media 
outreach. This involvement impacted the various votes that led to the integration of the 
four-pillars policy into Swiss legislation. The Peruvian case also illustrates the importance 
of education in solving the drug problem. The Peruvian central government recognized that 
it did not have sufficient knowledge of the San Martin problem and decentralized decision-
making regarding investment management in alternative crops. The specific measures to 
manage these crops were adopted under the responsibility of the local government and the 
peasant representations. The practical education of these local actors in the socio-economic 
issues of the region allowed them to make decisions with greater probabilities of success. 
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Among the variables with minor intervention in the 34 loops of the system are lack 
of security (in 13 loops), social anxiety (in 11 loops), and the lack of private or non-
governmental investment (in 9 loops)—the first, as a causal variable of the last two. Of 
these variables, non-governmental investment stands out. It was used as a leverage point 
in the Peruvian case once other countries and international organizations found the 
conditions of security and viability acceptable for investing in the San Martin region. 
Corruption—intervening in 6 of the 34 loops—resulting from the economic power of the 
illegal economy (in 12 loops) are variables whose interrelationship is documented in the 
case of Mexico in the 1930s, when the first entrepreneurs in the drug business got involved 
in politics to make their businesses more successful. Since then, the normalization of illicit 
behavior (a variable that occurs in 5 of the 34 loops of the system) increased, influencing 
the recruitment of individuals into the drug supply chain and the continuity of corruption. 
The lack of public policies to provide basic services, health programs that address 
the prevention of drug use, and alternative drug treatment are variables that intervene in 
three of the 34 loops of the system. The first of these variables influenced the case of Brazil, 
limiting the access of the inhabitants of the favelas to basic services, creating conditions of 
social marginalization in which criminal groups developed. In the same case, the 
emergence of the DTSs and social exclusion also influenced the population’s proclivity for 
illegal drug use. On the other hand, the Swiss government employed the last two 
variables—health programs and alternative drug treatment—to address heroin use. Finally, 
illegal drug availability and individual social acceptability also played a part in three of the 
34 loops of the system. The first variable increased drug abuse among the inhabitants of 
the Brazilian favelas, while the second had the same effect among the Swiss youth. 
The variables of the drug problem system can be considered nodes for the 
construction of a social network to appreciate their relative importance in terms of 
centrality (i.e., of the number and nature of connections they have within the network).220 
Figure 6 shows the social network where the size of the nodes—variables—depicts their 
 
220 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 207. 
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score in degree centrality representing their influence or power over other variables based 
on the count of their ties.221 
 
The network was obtained from the affiliation matrix formed by the CLD’s variables and 
loops (Table 1), using the variables as nodes.222 The resulting network has a relatively high 
density (0.795), which indicates good interconnectivity between the variables (i.e., 
variations in one node have a significant impact on the rest of the variables).223 
Figure 6. System’s variables network 
As shown in the shaded cells in Table 2, the ranking in Degree Centrality coincides 
with the ranking in frequency of the variable’s intervention in the system’s CLD loops in 
the first five and the last five variables. Numbers in parenthesis indicate the score of each 
variable in the correspondent parameter. 
 
221 Daniel Cunningham, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the Use of Social 
Network Analysis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 88. 
222 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 104, 105. 
223 Cunningham, Understanding Dark Networks, 88. 
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Table 2. Comparison of the variables’ ranking  
Ranking Frequency Degree Centrality 
1 
Poor national and subnational 
economies 
(29) 
Poor national and subnational 
economies 
(19) 
2 Lack of governmental income via taxes (29) 




Emergence of illegal drug supply 
chains 
(29) 
Emergence of illegal drug supply 
chains 
(19) 
4 Illegal drug consumption (26) 
Emergence of DTSs 
(19) 
5 Emergence of DTSs (23) 
Illegal drug consumption 
(18) 
6 Illegal economy workforce (19) 




Lack of legal employment 
opportunities 
(15) 




Lack of or deficient social and 
academic education 
(14) 
Lack of private investment 
(18) 
9 Lack of security (13) 
Lack of security 
(18) 
10 Profitable illegal drug supply economy (12) 
Illegal economy workforce 
(17) 
11 Social anxiety (11) 
Lack of or deficient social and 
academic education 
(16) 
12 Lack of private investment (9) 
Normalization of illicit behavior 
(illegality culture) 
(14) 
13 Corruption (6) 
Corruption 
(14) 









16 Individual social acceptability (3) 
Individual social acceptability 
(11) 
17 
Lack of social-oriented policies in 
basic services 
(3) 
Lack of social-oriented policies in 
basic services 
(11) 
18 Lack of health programs (3) 
Lack of health programs 
(10) 
19 Illegal drug availability (3) 
Illegal drug availability 
(9) 
20 
Lack of controlled option to acquire 
drugs 
(3) 




C. THE SYSTEM OF THE DRUG PROBLEM IN MEXICO  
The case of Mexico shows the confluence of different variables from Brazil and 
Peru’s case studies. The Brazilian case has in common with Mexico the trafficking of drugs 
produced in other countries—such as cocaine from South America and fentanyl from 
Asia—the pervasiveness of DTSs and other criminal groups involved in international drug 
supply chains, the inability to control related criminal activities, and corruption. 
Furthermore, Mexico and Brazil have the same problem of gaps in government presence 
that DTSs and other criminal groups have occupied to attain social capital. With the 
Peruvian case, the common variable is the large peasant labor force involved in the 
cultivation of illicit crops. The Brazil and Peru cases share with Mexico’s case the lack of 
governmental economic autonomy for implementing policies targeting the drug problem. 
Additionally, in Mexico, there is the problem of a large number of DTSs whose members—
together with the peasant, money laundering, and clandestine laboratories labor force—
make up the illegal drug economy’s workforce. 
Conversely, unlike Switzerland and Brazil, the indices of national drug 
consumption and their effects are still not significant in Mexico’s drug problem system. 
However, the demand for drugs in other countries is a driving force in the Mexican system. 
Furthermore, drug consumption in Mexico could yet become more prominent in the 
system’s behavior. 
On the other hand, consistent with the WD strategy, efforts and resources in Mexico 
have been mainly oriented toward disrupting drug supply chains. The specific actions have 
included operations against the leadership and operational structures of the DTSs and 
activities for the eradication of marijuana and poppy crops and the interdiction of drug 
shipments. These activities have been supported significantly by financing from the Merida 
initiative. 
Regarding the limitations to modify the behavior of the system, the variables 
associated with the state’s economic capacity and drug consumption are beyond the 
reasonable control of the Mexican government in the short term. Due to the recent COVID 
pandemic, the Mexican economy has been affected significantly, with no immediate 
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recovery in sight.224 This situation will force the Mexican government to selectively direct 
its resources into priority programs to mitigate the impact on family economies. Regarding 
illegal drug use, the demand it represents is not significant at the national level. Therefore, 
measures to reduce drug abuse are beyond the reach of the Mexican government. This 
situation would rule out the first five variables in the ranking of frequencies and degree 
centrality (see Table 2) as options for the Mexican government to address the drug problem. 
On the contrary, the variables associated with labor supply competition between 
DTSs and the legal market—including alternative crops in poppy and marijuana production 
areas—rank high in the score of degree centrality. An intervention by the Mexican 
government in the variables associated with the supply of jobs and lack of security would 
balance the outcomes of associated loops with a greater probability of modifying the 
system’s behavior. The last would imply directing governmental and non-governmental 
resources—such as private ones and those of the Merida initiative—to create legal jobs 
reducing the workforce available for the drug supply chain. Taking the general CLD of the 
drug problem as a model (Figure 4) to represent the system in Mexico, the variable “poor 
national and subnational economies” is replaced by “selective governmental investment,” 
and the variable “lack of private investment” is replaced by “non-governmental 
investment.” These changes are shown in Figure 7 colored red, while the green color 
represents the feedback and loops reversing their polarity due to said changes. 
 
224 Mariano Sanchez-Talanquer et al., Report on the Economic Impact of Coronavirus Disease 
(COVID-19) on Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile: CEPAL, Economic Commission for 




Figure 7. CLD of the drug problem in Mexico. Intervention in the most 
influential variables 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the feedback’s negative polarity implies that an 
increase/decrease in the cause impacts the dependent variable in the opposite direction 
(decrease/increase, respectively). Figure 8 details the loops switching polarity due to the 
change in the selected variables (color red). Feedbacks represented in the color green are 
those changing polarity. 
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Figure 8. Loops reversing polarity 
In the particular case of the affected loops, it is assumed that an increase in 
government investment could decrease the lack of security (loops 19, 22, and 23). 
Likewise, a decrease in lack of security would increase non-governmental investment 
(loops 22 and 23). Consequently, the increase in non-governmental investment coupled 
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with an increase in government investment would decrease the lack of legal employment 
opportunities observed in all loops except 19.  
Finally, the change expected in the system’s behavior is an increase in the legal 
labor supply, such as cultivation of alternative legal crops, that would divert members of 
the workforce from the illegal drug supply chains and gradually lead to higher tax 
collection to benefit the national economy. However, loops 19, 23, 32, and 33 demonstrate 
that the polarity shift would also impact national drug use indices and, consequently, the 
emergence of illegal drug supply chains and DTSs. In these strategies, the armed forces’ 




Using systems theory tools, this thesis has fulfilled its objective of proposing a 
model to explain the underlying system dynamics of the drug problem in Mexico and 
potential leverage points to reduce the problem through changes in public policy. The 
review of the historical factors of the problem in different fields of activity and human 
knowledge have made it possible to identify the variables that comprise the structure of the 
problem as a system. Additionally, the investigation of the case studies provided a thorough 
understanding of the feedback among these variables. Knowledge of the variables and their 
feedback facilitated the construction of the causal loop diagram of the drug problem system 
that describes the structure and behavior of the system in general. Furthermore, the social 
network analysis tools facilitated the determination of the most influential variables in the 
system’s behavior. As a result, the system of the particular case of Mexico was graphically 
represented, indicating specific leverage points that could mitigate the effects of the drug 
problem for the state. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis confirms the advantages of exhaustively studying a problem in order to 
offer sound alternative solutions. In their role as problem solvers, systems thinkers must 
provide decision makers with reliable tools to implement strategies that have the greatest 
probability of success. From this perspective, the study of the drug problem cannot be 
limited to fragmented analyses that offer short-term solutions based on simplistic 
heuristics. This type of solution to date has only managed to increase the resilience of 
illegal drug supply chains to the detriment of the resilience of individuals, states, and the 
international order. The study of the cases of Mexico and Brazil demonstrated this. On the 
other hand, the cases of Switzerland and Peru exemplify the advantages of an adequate 
approach for making sense of the drug problem and the value of double-loop learning. 
The alternatives with the greatest probability of success for addressing the drug 
problem in Mexico are the generation of job opportunities and the mitigation of security 
problems, requiring governmental and non-governmental capital. The activation of these 
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leverage points will reduce the availability of workforce members for the illegal drug 
supply chain and diminish one of the causes of illegal drug use nationally.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
This thesis takes the first step to formalize the holistic study of the drug problem in 
Mexico from a system dynamics perspective. Future systems modeling research is required 
to determine specific strategies and plans under particular time and space considerations. 
For example, the first actions under the proposed scheme may be limited to a municipality 
with low levels of security where there is the possibility of diverting workforce members 
from organizations associated with the drug supply chain. The experiences of the 
implemented plans could be incorporated into the double-loop learning process to improve 
strategies and decisions gradually, and successful strategies could be replicated in other 
municipalities. 
Another pending issue is the determination of the stakeholders that should be 
involved. For example, the armed forces could support the National Guard and civil 
authorities to create security conditions for private investment and the creation of sources 
of employment. Nevertheless, the implementation of job creation programs—such as 
alternative crops—will have to be left to other governmental secretariats. Finally, the 
participation of the Special Forces must also be defined. In addition to operations in support 
of the judicial authorities to capture relevant targets, the Special Forces could carry out 




APPENDIX. DRUG PROBLEM CLD’S LOOPS 
The following figures depict each of the 34 loops contained in the CLD of the drug 
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